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Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Under the
Trade Act of 1979
Subsidies, which are government conferred benefits on private in-
dustry, have drawn attention in recent years as significant non-tariff bar-
riers to trade.' Increased use of subsidies by U.S. trading partners has
resulted in larger quantities of imports, displacement of exports, and con-
tributed to the U.S. balance of trade deficit, which reached $27 billion in
1977.2 To counteract this governmental aid, the country whose industry
is injured may impose a tax to offset the effect of the other government's
subsidy. This surtax on incoming goods is known as a countervailing
duty and is imposed to neutralize the bounty or grant provided by the
subsidizing government. Due to growing economic interdependence
among major trading nations, extensive use of subsidies and counter-
vailing duties has a more direct effect on trade today than ever before.3
Consequently, Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 4 the
first major revision of U.S. countervailing duty law in eighty years.
Congress revised the countervailing duty law in order to accomplish
two major goals. First, Congress wanted to accelerate the investigatory
period for subsidy complaints by improving and expediting domestic dis-
pute settlement procedures. 5 Under the 1979 Act, those industries in-
jured by subsidized imports may anticipate relief within seven or eight
months6 rather than the one year period prescribed under the old law. 7
Second, Congress wanted to bring U.S. trade law into conformance with
I G. WEIL, AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: A NEW ROUND 26 (1975). Non-tariff barriers to
trade encompass a hugh array of activities which technically fulfill a nation's tariff commit-
ments but nevertheless impede the free flow of trade. These barriers range from obvious prefer-
ences in government procurement to subtle customs standards variations which discriminate
against foreign governments, and appear to be limited only by the imagination of governments.
An illustrative list of export subsidies, a type of non-tariff barrier, is provided in Annex A of the
subsidy/countervailing duty code of the GATT.
2 Perkins, The Continuing Crisis in Trade I (1978) (prepared for the League of Women
Voters of the United States).
3 R. BALDWIN, THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: TOWARD GREATER LiB-
ERALIZATION? 4 (1979).
4 Pub. L. No. 96-39 (to be codified in scattered sections of 19, 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
cited as TAA].
5 See H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1979).
6 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1592, 1671-1671e).
7 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4) (1976) (amended 1979). While the seven
month time limit was projected for countervailing duty determinations, actual decisions may be
reached even earlier. A recent action by the Commerce Department in response to a subsidy
complaint shows an attempt to adhere to or even expedite the dispute settlement process. On
March 14, 1980, the Commerce Department announced an investigation into charges that In-
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commitments the United States made in the negotiations for the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).8 The United States was obli-
gated under the recently concluded Tokyo Round of GATT trade nego-
tiations to enact implementing legislation that inserted a "material
injury" provision into U.S. law.9 Conforming U.S. law to GATT agree-
ments should result in some gain and very little loss to the United States
in the area of subsidies.
Prior to the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, Congress had expressed
great dissatisfaction with the Treasury Department's administration of
the countervailing duty statute, finding investigations too lengthy and
decisions unreasonably delayed.' 0 Two approaches to solving this prob-
lem were undertaken. First, under a January 1980 executive order,"I ad-
ministration of the statute was shifted from the Treasury to the
Commerce Department. Second, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
contains specific deadlines for the Commerce Department and the Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC) to meet in each phase of the investiga-
tory process.' 2 No specific time limitations or operating procedures had
existed under old U.S. countervailing duty law. The 1974 Trade Act
merely required the Treasury to complete a preliminary investigation
within six months and to issue a final determination within another six
months.' 3 Thus, the 1974 Act had alloted a total investigatory period of
one year before countervailing duties had to be imposed. Virtual de-
struction of an injured domestic industry could occur with such a slow
process.
Under the 1979 Trade Act, exact procedures and specific time limi-
tations for countervailing duty determinations are set forth [see Table I].
A countervailing duty proceeding is initiated by the filing of a petition
with the Secretary of the Commerce Department' 4 and the ITC on the
dia subsidized exports of certain iron castings. Projected determination dates were set at May
14, 1980, for a preliminary determination, and July 28, 1980, for a final determination.
8 H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1979).
The GATT trade agreements are not self-executing and thus do not have independent
effect under U.S. law. Rather than possessing the status of binding domestic law, the GATT
has served as a unique forum for trade negotiations. Seven rounds of periodic trade negotia-
tions have been held under the auspices of the GATT since 1947. While the first six rounds
dealt primarily with tariff rate issues, most of these concerns were resolved by the sixth or "Ken-
nedy Round." The seventh or "Tokyo Round" shifted emphasis from tariff rates to non-tariff
barriers to trade. Graham, A Practitioner's Gu:de to the Tokyo Round Trade Negotiatons, 4 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 225, 227-28 (1979).
9 H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1979).
1o Id. at 24.
11 Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
12 See generally TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-16710.
13 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(4) (1976) (amended 1979).
14 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. 1671). The Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 refers to filing a petition with the "administering authority." This phrase was used
because, while historically the authority has been the Treasury Department, Congress antici-
pated future legislation shifting the administration of the statute to another governmental body.
Subsequent legislation has removed the Treasury Department from that role and now directs
the Secretary of the Commerce Department to administer the law. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45
Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
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Table I
Preliminary
investigation
-85 days-
or
-150 days-
in complicated
cases
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same day.15 This petition may be filed by either the Commerce Depart-
ment in the case of a self-initiated investigation, or more commonly by a
domestic manufacturer, producer or wholesaler, a certified union or
group of workers, or a trade or business association producing a product
like the subsidized product.' 6 The petition must include sufficient infor-
mation to make out a prima facie case showing the existence of a subsidy,
material injury, and a causal link between the two. 17 Information that
must be included in the petition, to the extent it is reasonably available
to the petitioner,' 8 includes: the name of petitioner and the industry on
whose behalf the petition is filed; a statement indicating other forms of
relief sought; a detailed description of the imported merchandise; the
name of the country or countries producing and exporting the merchan-
dise; the volume and value of the imports over at least the two previous
years; all pertinent facts about the subsidy; information as to the likeli-
hood of importation of an article not being imported as of the time the
petition was filed; an allegation of "material injury;" and, if "critical cir-
cumstances" are alleged, information regarding injury caused by massive
imports over a short period of time. 19
The Commerce Department then has 20 days from the filing date to
determine whether the petition properly alleges subsidies for which a
countervailing duty may be imposed.20 If the Commerce Department's
determination is affirmative, the investigation begins with notification to
the ITC of commencement and publication of the decision to investigate
in the Federal Register.2 ' Public notice published in the Federal Register is
required through all phases of the investigation whenever the Commerce
Department or ITC reaches a significant decision. 22 If, after 20 days, the
Commerce Department decides that the petition does not allege a prima
facie case, the petition is dismissed, the investigation terminates, and ap-
propriate notification is provided in the Federal Register and to the peti-
tioner himself.23 This procedure-dismissal of petition, termination of
investigation, and appropriate notification-is followed whenever a neg-
ative determination is reached at any phase of the investigation.2 4
On the other hand, if the Commerce Department determines that
the petition is satisfactory, the ITC has 45 days to determine if there is a
15 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(l)-(2)).
16 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(l)).
17 Id.
18 In using the language "reasonably available," Congress anticipated that the administer-
ing authority will act upon most petitions, only rejecting clearly frivolous petitions or those
containing major omissions. H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1979).
19 COMM. OF THE WHOLE HOUSE, STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R.
Doc. No. 96,153, Part II, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 412-414, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 665, 683-84 [hereinafter cited as STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION].
20 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)).
21 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(2)-(d)).
22 Segeneralo id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-16710.
23 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 167 1a(c)).
24 Seegenerally id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-16710.
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reasonable indication of injury to a domestic industry. 25 Due to the time
limitations, it is not practical for the ITC to hold hearings or issue ques-
tionnaires to the parties as it does during the final stage of its investiga-
tion.26 At the preliminary stage, the ITC investigates allegations in the
petition as to "material injury" by focusing on the description of the sub-
sidized merchandise and its amount. 2 7 Concurrently, the Commerce De-
partment has 85 days from the filing date, but not before the ITC
reaches an affirmative determination, to make a preliminary determina-
tion of whether a reasonable basis exists for belief or suspicion of the
existence of a subsidy.28 If the petitioner so requests or the case is found
to be "extraordinarily complicated," the Commerce Department may
postpone its preliminary determination for an additional 65 days.29 An
"extraordinarily complicated" case could involve a large number of com-
plex subsidy practices, novel issues, a need to determine the extent to
which the subsidies are used, or a large number of firms whose acts must
be investigated.3 0 Notification of the postponement must be made at
least 20 days before the date that the preliminary determination was re-
quired a. 3  This determination is reviewable by the Customs Court on pe-
tition filed by an interested party3 2 within 30 days of the
determination.3
3
When the preliminary determination is affirmative, the Commerce
Department provides an estimate of the net subsidy3 4 and orders provi-
sional measures in the form of suspending liquidation of all entries of the
protested merchandise.3 5  A "suspension of liquidation" means sus-
pending the final settling of the Customs bill. Upon preliminary deter-
mination by the Commerce Department that injury exists, the foreign
exporter is required to post a bond to cover the actual duties and possible
countervailing duties that might be imposed.3 6 When a final determina-
tion is reached, the technique of suspending liquidation enables the gov-
ernment to operate retroactively and endorse the posted bond if injury
was found or refund it if there was a negative determination as to injury
in the final stage.3 7 Thus, suspension of liquidation serves mainly as a
25 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671b).
26 STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION, supra note 19, at 397-98, U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 671-72.
27 Id. at 398, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 672.
28 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(b)).
29 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(c)(I)).
30 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(c)(l)(B)(i)).
31 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(c)(2)).
32 The term "interested party" includes foreign manufacturers and producers, the U.S.
importers involved, the government of the manufacturing country, labor unions, and U.S. man-
ufacturers of like products. Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)).
33 STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 399, U.S.-CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 672-73.
34 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)).
35 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(d)).
36 S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1979).
37 d at 59.
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provisional measure to protect the petitioning industry during the inves-
tigatory period.
Under this "fast-track" procedure, the deposit of a bond for a possi-
ble subsidy violation may be required for up to four months during an
investigation where delay would result in injury to a domestic industry. 38
In critical circumstances, a suspension of liquidation may also be im-
posed, within prescribed time limits, on imports entered or withdrawn
from the warehouse for consumption for the period extending ninety
days before the date on which suspension of liquidation was first or-
dered. 39
Termination of a subsidy investigation may occur in several ways.
The Commerce Department may terminate the investigation upon with-
drawal of the petition by petitioner, after notice to all parties, unless to
do so would not be in the public interest. 40 The ITC may also terminate
the investigation, but only after the Commerce Department's prelimi-
nary determination. 4' The Commerce Department may suspend the in-
vestigation if the exporters or foreign government agree to eliminate or
completely offset the subsidy within six months or to cease exportation of
the goods to the United States within six months. 42 In extraordinary
circumstances special provisions are made whereby the Commerce De-
partment may make a suspension agreement with the foreign govern-
ment concerned rather than continue the investigation. 43 An agreement
pursuant to this section must stipulate that price levels of domestic prod-
ucts will not be undercut or suppressed by imports of similar merchan-
dise and that not less than 85% of the net subsidy will be offset. 44 To
provide for effective enforcement and monitoring of these suspension
agreements, the Commerce Department may prescribe necessary regula-
tions.4 5 No agreement to suspend may be accepted until the Commerce
Department consults with the petitioner, provides him with a copy of the
proposed agreement, notifies all parties, and permits all parties to submit
comments.
46
Thus, two types of agreements exist with differing results. The first,
an agreement to eliminate or offset a subsidy or cease exports of the sub-
sidized product, results in no liquidation suspension and the refund of a
posted bond upon affirmative preliminary determination of injury to a
38 Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 161 (1979).
39 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(e)(2)).
40 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(a)). Withdrawal of the petition by the peti-
tioner may occur for a variety of reasons, including a raise in price by the foreign government,
pressure of other domestic industries, a cease in the exportation of the protested product, or a
change in the economy, to name a few.
41 Id.
42 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(b)).
43 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)).
44 Ifd (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(c)(2)).
45 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(d)(3)).
46 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(e)).
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domestic industry. 47 The second type of agreement, one with a foreign
government to eliminate the injurious effects of the subsidy, results in
suspension of liquidation where there is an affirmative preliminary deter-
mination.
48
Suspension of liquidation, a penalty, must be distinguished from
suspension of the entire investigation, a benefit for the exporter. After an
ITC suspension of the investigation, the investigation may be continued
upon request of the foreign government involved, the petitioner, or an
interested party supporting the petition during the twenty days following
the publication date of the notice that the investigation was suspended.
49
Notwithstanding the prior agreement, as long as a timely request is filed
the investigation must be continued. If the Commerce Department de-
termines that the suspension agreement is being violated, retroactive
countermeasures are available. 50 All suspension agreements are subject
to judicial review.
The Commerce Department has 75 days from the date of the pre-
liminary determination to make a final determination as to whether a
subsidy is being provided with respect to the merchandise in question.5 '
Before this determination is reached, the Commerce Department is
obliged to disclose all non-confidential information to the parties in-
volved. 52 All interested parties may then present written or oral views on
the case. 53 The ITC must reach its final determination before the later
of the 120th day after the Commerce Department's affirmative prelimi-
nary determination or the 45th day after the Commerce Department's
final determination. 54 If the Commerce Department's preliminary deter-
mination was negative, but its final determination is affirmative, the ITC
must make its final determination within 75 days of the Commerce De-
partment's final determination. 55 Interested parties may appear before
the ITC and voice their opinions on the matter. All final determinations
must be supported by a statement of findings of fact and legal conclu-
sions on all material issues which shall be made available to all interested
parties and the public in general. 56
Within 7 days of notification that the ITC's final determination was
affirmative, the Commerce Department shall publish a countervailing
duty order. 57 The countervailing duty order directs customs officers to
47 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(0(2)(A)).
48 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(0(2)(B)).
49 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(g)).
50 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671c(i)).
51 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(I)).
52 STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, supra note 19, at 406, U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 678.
53 Id
54 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(2)).
55 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(3)).
56 STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ATION, supra note 19, at 408, U.S.CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 680.
57 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)).
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assess a duty equal to the amount of the net subsidy found to exist. The
assessment must be made within six months of the date the Commerce
Department received satisfactory information on which to base such an
assessment, but not later than twelve months after the end of the ex-
porter's annual accounting period. 58 The order must describe the appli-
cable merchandise in detail and require payment of estimated
countervailing duties pending the liquidation of entries of merchan-
dise. 59 If the estimated amount of the countervailing duty for provi-
sional measures differs from the amount set under the order, in no
instance will the importer be disadvantaged. If the estimated duty is
lower than the ordered duty, the difference is to be disregarded; to the
extent the estimated duty exceeded the ordered amount, it shall be re-
funded.60
Under the dispute settlement procedures of the 1979 Act, it is esti-
mated that disputes should normally be resolved within seven months
rather than the one year period prescribed in the Trade Act of 1974.61
Improved notification and consultation proceedings should also expedite
conclusion of countervailing duty proceedings. 62 Due to the threat of
provisional measures (suspension of liquidation actions), foreign govern-
ments will have an incentive to supply relevant information upon the
initiation of the investigation.6 3 Interested parties will have access to rel-
evant information and will be informed of the reasons for all decisions
made to ensure greater visibility of administrative proceedings. In sum,
it appears that the new dispute settlement procedure will result in a more
open, expeditious investigation procedure with less deleterious effects on
domestic industry from competing subsidized industries.64
Along with improving settlement procedures, the 1979 Trade Act
implements U.S. obligations from the seventh or Tokyo Round of the
GATT. A major U.S. purpose in entering the Tokyo Round was to at-
tain a world-wide acknowledgement of the fact that non-trade related
subsidies have harmful effects. 65 Growing economic intervention by gov-
ernments in redistributing income to groups found to be "socially deserv-
ing" has been a major reason for subsidization. 66  Government
58 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(l)). The applicable accounting period is the
one within which merchandise is entered or withdrawn from the warehouse for consumption.
Id
59 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(2)-(3)).
60 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(b)(2)).
61 H.R. REP. No. 96-317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1979).
62 C.F. Bergsten, A Framework For Trade Policy in the 1980's: The New Sub-
sidy/Countervailing Duty Code 14-15 (April 26, 1979) (paper presented before the American
Society of International Law, Washington, D.C.).
63 Id at 15.
64 Id.
65 United States Delegation to the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Proposed Arrange-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (Background Notes) I (press release of July 10,
1978) [hereinafter cited as Background Notes].
66 R. BALDWIN, supra note 3, at 3.
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justifications for subsidizing private industries include the promotion of
infant industries, creation of employment in depressed regions, research
and development of new technology, and disposal of agricultural sur-
pluses.6 7 This funding has resulted in what has been termed a "beggar-
thy-neighbor" situation, or the building up of one nation's industry at
the expense of another nation's interest. 68
Earlier GATT discussions had centered on the philosophical ques-
tion of whether these government grants were "good" or "bad."'6 9 The
Tokyo Round agreements acknowledged for the first time that govern-
ment subsidization to promote important national objectives not directly
related to trade may have harmful effects on trade by conferring an arti-
ficial competitive advantage on a domestic industry. 70 A government
subsidy "good" in purpose could easily have "bad" effects in another
country and thus be countervailable. On the other hand, a government
subsidy unjustifiable in purpose, yet causing no "material injury" to a
foreign country, is not countervailable. The acceptance of the fact that
non-trade related subsidies may cause harmful effects shifted the Tokyo
Round focus from the academic issue of whether a subsidy is per se illegal
to an inquiry into the injurious consequences of subsidies and was consid-
ered a significant U.S. achievement. 7'
In exchange for recognition of the fact that, regardless of its benevo-
lent purpose, any subsidy may cause injury, the United States agreed to
insert an injury test in the U.S. countervailing duty statute. 72 Prior to
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the United States was the only major
industrial nation capable of imposing countervailing duties without re-
quiring that injury first be shown to a domestic industry. 73 While the
GATT contained such a requirement, the United States was exempted
from this provision under the "grandfather clause."' 74 The grandfather
clause permitted nations with preexisting legislation contrary to the
GATT to continue to apply their domestic law. The original U.S. coun-
tervailing duty law was enacted in 1897 and instructed the Secretary of
the Treasury to impose on all dutiable imports a tax equal to the net
amount of any bounty or grant bestowed on the exportation of the arti-
cle. 75 Congress' subsequent reenactments of the statute did not substan-
tially change the statute's language or include any mention of injury. 76
67 J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 437 (1977).
68 d.
69 Background Notes, supra note 65, at 1.
70 Graham, Revolulion Mn Trad Politics, 36 FOREIGN POL'Y 49, 53 (1979).
71 Background Notes, supra note 65, at 1.
72 Id
73 C.F. Bergsten, supra note 62, at 6.
74 The "grandfather clause" is contained in the Protocol of Provisional Application of the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, art. 1(b), 61 Stat. A2051, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
75 Tariff Act of 1897, c. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 205 (current version to be codified in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303).
76 See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978; Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497,
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Thus, the United States was permitted under the grandfather clause to
countervail against subsidized imports even though no domestic industry
was injured. Not until the Trade Act of 1974 did U.S. legislation incor-
porate an injury standard into the countervailing duty law, and this
standard was applied only to duty-free goods. 77 All dutiable goods con-
tinued to be exempt from the requirement under the grandfather clause
of the GATT.
Literally interpreted, the statute gave the Treasury Department no
discretion in determining whether to assess a duty: if a bounty or grant
existed, a countervailing duty had to be imposed. 78 Considering the
large number of subsidies other governments were providing various in-
dustries, such a literal application of the statute probably would have led
to retaliatory measures by U.S. trading partners. 79 Consequently, the
Treasury Department never literally applied the countervailing duty
statute.8 0 Strict application of the statute was avoided by permitting the
Treasury Department to exercise sweeping discretion in determining
whether a particular product was subsidized . 8  The broad language of
the statute, not defining "bounty" or "grant," allowed the Treasury flex-
ibility in construing what constituted a subsidy.8 2 Therefore, the Treas-
ury's application of the statute struck a balance between countervailing
against all subsidies conferred upon foreign producers, which number in
the hundreds each year, and ignoring all but the most blatant infrac-
tions.8 3 In effect, it appears that the Treasury Department used discre-
tionary authority to imply an injury requirement into U.S. law, though
none existed on the face of the statute.
The Treasury's discretionary authority was curtailed indirectly by
the Trade Act of 1974. The Act amended the 1930 countervailing duty
statute so as to permit a U.S. manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler to
seek judicial review of Treasury Department determinations in the U.S.
Customs Court. 4 Courts applied the clear language of the statute to the
cases in holding that countervailing duties were to be imposed upon a
§ 303, 46 Stat. 687; Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935; Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16,
§ B, 38 Stat. 193; Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 6, 36 Stat. 85.
77 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d)(2) (1976) (repealed 1979). Since the original countervailing duty
law made no reference to duty-free goods, they were not "grandfathered" under the protocol of
the GATT. Consequently, in the Trade Act of 1974, an injury test was included, but only with
respect to dutiable goods. Id § 1303(b) (amended 1979).
78 Note, Countervaihg Duties and Nonexcessiove Rebates, 43 ALB. L. REV. 617, 625 (1979). A
presumption of correctness attached to the Treasury's determination that a subsidy was being
provided. See, e.g., V. Mueller & Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354 (C.C.P.A. 1940); Franklin
Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 178 F. 743 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910).
79 G. WELL, supra note 1, at 28.
80 Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discri~nination: United States Countervailing
and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 55 (1958).
81 Id.; see also Downs v. United States, 113 F. 144 (4th Cir. 1902), afd, 187 U.S. 496
(1903); Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 178 F. 743 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910).
82 Note, supra note 78, at 626.
83 R. BALDWIN, supra note 3, at 9.
84 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b)(1)(A) (1976) (amended 1979).
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finding of a "bounty" or "grant" without considering whether injury had
occurred.8 5 As recently as 1979, in the case of ASG Industries, Inc. v. United
States,8 6 the Customs Court stated that the countervailing duty statute
was mandatory in its terms and that it was error on the part of the Treas-
ury Department to employ a test of injury to U.S. trade as a condition of
subsidy imposition.
8 7
The 1979 Trade Act's insertion of an injury determination as a pre-
requisite to imposing a countervailing duty closely aligns the statute with
the Treasury's previous enforcement of the countervailing duty law, al-
though the actual word "injury" in relation to dutiable goods had never
before appeared in U.S. legislation. The new test defines "injury" as ma-
terial injury or threat thereof to a domestic industry or material retarda-
tion of the establishment of such an industry.8 8 "Material" means "not
immaterial, inconsequential, or unimportant,"8 9 that is, amounting to
more than a de minimus standard.
For the first time, specific criteria are listed that industries seeking
relief may apply to ascertain whether a countervailable injury has oc-
curred. 9° Factors to be considered in determining injury include signifi-
cant volume increases, 9 1 the relationship between the subsidized import
and depressed home market prices, and the impact of the import on the
affected industry in terms of sales, market share, employment, and
growth.9 2 While the presence or absence of any of these factors is not
conclusive to an injury determination, they do provide an indication of
what the ITC will consider in its investigation. 93 Of course, the signifi-
cance of each factor depends on the facts of the individual case. 94 How-
ever, in defining injury, other factors that might be causing the harm,
such as changes in consumer tastes, outdated facilities, trade restrictive
85 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 473 U.S. 443 (1978); Michelin Tire Corp. v.
United States, 469 F. Supp. 270 (Cust. Ct. 1979), appeal dismissed sub. noma. United States v.
Watson, 603 F.2d 192 (C.C.P.A. 1979); ASG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200
(Cust. Ct. 1979).
86 48 U.S.L.W. 2404 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
87 Id.
88 TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2)).
89 Id (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)).
90 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)).
9t Volume increases may be either absolute or relative to production and consumption in
the United States. Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)).
92 Id. (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)).
93 STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION, supra note 19, at 88, U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 474.
94 Id Injury may occur even in the situation where only a limited geographical segment
of an industry is harmed, rather than the total domestic industry. TAA, supra note 4, § 101 (to
be codified in § 1677(4)(C)). Special rules are applied for agricultural products. Even if agri-
cultural employment or gross sales increase, if subsidized imports have a significant effect on
profits, that alone could be sufficient for imposition of a countervailing duty. See STATEMENTS
'OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION, supra note 19, at 434, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 699; TAA,
supra note 4, § 101 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(D)).
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practices, or other competition must not be considered. 95
Reactions within the United States to the imposition of an injury
test in U.S. law have varied. Official AFL-CIO policy rejects the use of
an injury test on the ground that subsidies are unfair practices and
should be actionable per se.96 The rationale behind their argument is
that subsidies are bad in themselves and no matter how efficient a U.S.
manufacturer is, he cannot effectively compete with imported products
subsidized by the resources of a foreign government. 97 The AFL-CIO
argues that even if a domestic industry is only marginally injured by a
subsidy, it is entitled to relief because it is losing business it otherwise
would have received. 98 Furthermore, while consumers are paying lower
prices for subsidized products, they are benefitting unfairly at the ex-
pense of another sector of the economy.99
However, not all U.S. observers have agreed with this analysis.
Some felt that past U.S. nonconformance with the injury standard ap-
plied to the other trading partners was costing the United States more
than was justifiable by U.S. ability to impose automatic countervailing
duties.1°° The alleged detrimental effects of incorporating an injury re-
quirement into the statute were also questioned. 10 1 If a bounty could
exist without adverse effects on international trade, it was contended,
there really was no need to require an offsetting tax. 10 2 As long as U.S.
production and employment were unaffected, U.S. consumers should not
be deprived of low-priced products made possible through subsidies paid
by foreign governments. 10 3
It would appear that proponents of the injury test have not specifi-
cally addressed opponents' contention that any subsidy may cause harm
to some sector of the economy, thus affecting employment and produc-
tion. The countervailing duty statute has, however, effected a balance
between the two extremes: (1) that all subsidies require a surtax, and (2)
that some subsidies do not cause any harm. A balance was achieved by
inserting a "material injury" test into the statute. The requirement that
more than a de minmus injury be found could well solve the confusion
the Treasury Department faced in attempting to enforce the old statute.
By adding a concrete standard which must be systematically applied
95 STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION, supra note 19, at 435, U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 700; C.F. Bergsten, supra note 62, at 5.
96 Bocskor, The Tokyo Round- A Labor Vtw, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219, 222-23 (1979).
97 Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Non-Tarif Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 327, 347 (1975).
98 Id.
99 id
I00 C.F. Bergsten, supra note 62, at 6.
101 ASG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 48 U.S.L.W. 2404 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Markey, C.J.
& Rich, J., dissenting).
102 Id
103 C.F. Bergsten, supra note 62, at 6.
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prior to imposing countervailing duties, subsidy complaints may be sum-
marily dismissed where no consequential injury exists.
Though slight harms may be caused to domestic industry due to
adoption of a material injury test, overall the United States should be in
a better position with the test than without it. First, the test provides an
objective standard for the Commerce Department to apply in subsidy
determinations, which should result in a more uniform degree of counter-
vailing duty imposition where a material injury is occurring. Second, the
United States' refusal to adopt an injury test had made other nations
unwilling to compromise in their use of subsidies.' 0 4 After the Tokyo
Round, other nations should inspect their subsidy practices more closely
due to the new understanding that any subsidy is actionable if material
injury is caused. The recognition of the harmful effects of subsidies that
have non-trade related objectives, coupled with the greatly expedited dis-
pute settlement procedure, should outweigh any slight disadvantage of
the injury test and provide a more effective future approach by the U.S.
government to the subsidy issue.
-KATHLEEN T. WEAVER
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